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how can God so much as know that he has the power to actualize T(W) unless 
he knows whether or not Adam would eat the apple if placed in h? Hence, 
God's knowledge of which largest state of affairs he'll strongly actualize must 
be logically posterior to his knowledge of what Adam would do in h; if God 
doesn't first know the latter, there is no way in which he can know the former. 
But if God can thus employ Wierenga's counterfactuals of world-actualiza-
tion only if he knows Molinist counterfactuals, then Wierenga's counterfac-
tuals can play no essential role in a theory of middle knowledge. 
As is customary in reviews such as this, my remarks have focussed primar-
ily on the faults I find with Wierenga's work, and thus might well mask the 
large extent to which I find his positions admirably stated and ably defended. 
Despite what I see as the three significant flaws in the book, and despite the 
surprisingly careless editing which was done with the text (I noticed well 
over a dozen cases of misspelling, missing words and the like), Wierenga's 
The Nature of God is a fine piece of work, one which scholars concerned 
with divine attributes should profit from considerably.s 
NOTES 
1. See "Maximal Power," in Alfred J. Freddoso, ed., The Existence and Nature o/God, 
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 81-113. 
2. See section 4.5 of Freddoso's introduction, in his On Divine Foreknowledge: Part 
IVo/the Concordia. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 53-62. 
3. See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
chapters 2-7. 
4. See, for example, Freddoso's introduction to 011 Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 22, 50. 
5. I am grateful to Alfred Freddoso, Alvin Plantinga and Especially Edward Wierenga 
for comments on an earlier version of this review. 
Relativism, Nihilism, and God, Philip E. Devine. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xix and 119. $22.95 
FREDERICK FERRE, The University of Georgia 
This is a remarkable little book. It packs plenty of explosives into its 109 
pages of text. It reads well, written in a fresh, confident tone. And it is written 
in a good cause: to provide theoretical underpinnings that permit joint alle-
giance to the life of faith and the life of reason. 
The argument by which this cause is pursued is quite straightforward. In 
the name of a transcendent Truth, Devine attacks pragmatism, relativism, and 
nihilism. The first naturalizes the standards of truth, the second pluralizes 
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them, and the third abandons them. Each position is shown to refute itself, 
and in various ways Devine challenges his opponents to prove their conten-
tions without smuggling in some appeal to a stronger sense of truth than their 
doctrines permit. (His technique of shifting the burden of proof is subtle and 
effective.) Then, having shown Truth indispensable, he argues that the most 
plausible understanding of the basic moral and epistemic norms, Goodness 
and Truth, can be provided by appeal to God as certifier. An atheist defense 
of these basic norms, as somehow floating in metaphysical mid-air, may, of 
course, be proposed. "But the source of such norms is as obscure as is God, 
and hence it is not plausible that the existence of such norms could be 
regarded as an intelligible possibility, and the existence of God not" (p. 84). 
In the course of this argument, Devine takes on, with special relish, Rorty 
and Derrida, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. The book is much too short, of 
course, for detailed exposition and examination of the positions that he har-
ries, but he has a keen ear for cant and a deft hand at exposing paradox. 
Occasionally, as one of the prices paid for such deft compression of argu-
ment, Devine cartoons the positions he intends to skewer. It is unfair, for exam-
ple, in defining William James's pragmatism, to quote out of context the famous 
line, "The true ... is only the expedient in our way of thinking" (p. 23). 
James typically delighted in using the most provocative language possible, 
then adding important qualifiers. The "expedient," finally is not mere gross 
immediate practical advantage (e.g., getting tenure, as Devine suggests), but, 
as James put it, what can be depended upon on the whole and over the 1011g 
run. The book would have benefitted from deeper discussion of more sophisti-
cated and refined pragmatic approaches to truth. Instead, Devine immediately 
switched attention to Rorty's version and chased off after it, leaving at least this 
reader feeling that important possibilities were never adequately addressed. 
Another disappointment was in Devine's critique of "applied ethics." It is 
an important topic. Everything Devine says about the need for philosophers to 
avoid becoming mere propagandists is right on target. But he seems to assume 
without the slightest argument that "applied ethics" entails partisanship and 
disregard for Truth. This is hardly necessary. It might be better, as he ac-
knowledges in a footnote, if another set of terms rather than "applied" and 
"pure" were used for the distinction between ethical theory, as considered in 
close connection with some specific domain of human concern, and ethical 
theory as considered at higher levels of abstraction from the current issues of 
life. Some concrete data are necessary at any level, no matter how highly 
general; some theoretical concepts are necessary at any level, no matter how 
specific. It might be more apt, if so, to discuss the contrast between "general" 
and "specific" ethics. Then "general" ethics could be considered more like 
the area illumination provided in an art gallery, to help us see the various pictures 
in their mutual relationship, and "specific" ethics could be considered like the 
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spotlights focussed on particular works themselves, to help us see more 
clearly into the details. Both are needed. General ethics can learn much from 
the special challenges raised in close wrestling with particular areas where 
policy is required. Specific ethics can benefit from the connections provided by 
the powerful abstractions of general ethics. In the end Devine reaches a sound 
conclusion: 
The most distinctive public responsibility [of philosophers] is not tied to any 
particular issue. It is to do what we can to produce citizens who are aware 
of the issues and the tradition of discussing them rationally (p. 20). 
This is true. But there is nothing wrong in principle with examining "the issues" 
closely, in pools of intense light, as well as distantly, in large areas of general 
illumination. If in practice philosophers become partisan propagandists, this is 
a reflection of our human frailties, not an argument against giving special ethical 
attention to medicine, business, the environment, war, and the like. 
Finally, the book suffers from an anticlimactic ending. The real climax is 
the moral argument for God offered in Chapter 6. There the weakness of 
nihilism makes contact with the potency of theism and everything is tied 
together, morally and epistemologically. It is a bold stroke to cap many such 
strokes. There are questions left, of course. For example, does Devine really 
want to rest so much on mere "picture preference" when choosing between 
a personal deity and austere, impersonal Truth? But, despite many unsettled 
issues, the book coheres and concludes there. 
Unfortunately, Chapter 7, on religion, tries to cover so many issues that the 
book thins out like a fresh stream into a marshy delta. At the very end Devine 
adds a promissory note for another book on "problems that arise when one 
attempts to embody this project in our world ... " (p. 109). Actually, the 
religion chapter already starts this embodied discussion. This is why, perhaps, 
it feels disconnected from the previous chapters of the book. 
We may look forward to another run at these themes, then picked up again 
and more fully treated, when Devine delivers on his promised next volume. 
Meanwhile, we have a book in hand that deserves-and will doubtless at-
tract-plenty of attention. 
Theology and Integration, Four Essays in Philosophical Theology. Anders JefTner. 
(Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia, 28) 
Distributed by Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm; 1987; 73 pp. n.p. 
ALAN P. F. SELL, The University of Calgary 
One of Sweden's most perceptive philosophical theologians here presents 
four essays, the running theme of which is the relationship between religious 
